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Abstract
The interaction of disclosure laws and the targeted behavior is typically unknown since data
on disclosed activity rarely exist in the absence of disclosure laws. We exploit data from legal
settlements disclosing $316 million in pharmaceutical company payments to 316,622 physicians
across the U.S. from 2009-2011. States were classified as having strong, weak, or no disclosure
based on whether data were reported only to state authorities (weak) or were publicly available
(strong). Strong disclosure law was associated with reduced payments among doctors accept-
ing less than $100 and increased payments among doctors accepting greater than $100. Weak
disclosure states, despite imposing administrative compliance costs to industry, were indistin-
guishable from no disclosure states. This result suggests that the primary mechanism for fewer
small payments in strong disclosure states was physicians’ reduced willingness to accept payments
rather than the imposition of significant administrative costs on industry. We conduct additional
analysis holding fixed the cost for pharmaceutical companies of disclosing data, which was pos-
sible because Massachusetts began releasing payment data online during our sample period.
Differences-in-differences analyses and multiple regression yield similar estimates for each pay-
ment category: Mandatory disclosure reduced payments for speaking and for meals but increased
payments for consulting activities. Differences-in-discontinuities in distribution of payments at
the disclosure threshold among strong and weak disclosure states support the interpretation of
physicians’ reduced willingness to accept payments. Significant disclosure aversion reducing con-
flicts of interest is consistent with the policy goals of mandatory disclosure, though the increased
payments among those receiving large payments may have been unintended.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and the medical profession is the subject
of heated debate in both the U.S. and Europe (see, e.g., Article 94 of European Parliament and
Council Directive 200/83/EC on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human
use, as amended; German Supreme Court decisions in the cases 3 StR 458/10, 4 StR 239/03, and
1 Str 165/03). In recent years, professional organizations have produced policy recommendations
to limit contact between physicians and the pharmaceutical industry (see, e.g., Articles 9-14 of
the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA) Code on the
Promotion of Prescription-Only Medicines to, and Interactions with, Healthcare Professionals;
and various publications of the World Health Organization (WHO), including "Understanding
and Responding to Pharmaceutical Promotion: A Practical Guide," 2011, aimed at healthcare
professionals). A large body of research recently summarized by the World Health Organiza-
tion suggests that physicians may be influenced by financial conflicts of interest (Norris et al.
2005); recommendations limiting the size of transactions between physicians and pharmaceutical
companies have been adopted by professional and industry groups.
Spending by the pharmaceutical industry on promotions and marketing in the U.S. grew from
$11 billion in 1996 to an estimated $29 billion in 2011 (Donohue et al. 2007), with other indepen-
dent estimates placing the number much higher (Donohue et al. 2007, IMS Health 2011, Kerber
2004, Wolfe, 1996, Gagnon and Lexchin 2008). Even accounting for direct-to-consumer adver-
tising, 90% of promotional expenditures are directed towards physicians, amounting to between
$30,000 and $61,000 per physician each year (Donohue et al. 2007). Although direct payments to
physicians appear to constitute a relatively small proportion of these promotional expenditures,
they are the subject of professional and political controversy. There is concern that these trans-
actions may create conflicts of interest that undermine clinical objectivity and public trust in
physician recommendations (Wazana 2000, Studdert et al. 2004, Chimonas et al. 2007, Campbell
2007). Moreover, industry-physician relationships have been linked to medical research, discov-
ery, and promulgation of new drugs (Cockburn and Henderson 1998, Chatterji et al. 2008, Zinner
et al. 2009).
The prevailing strategy for addressing potential conflicts of interest has been enhancement and
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enforcement of disclosure (Katz et al. 2003). This has been the case despite a lack of empirical
evidence regarding the effects of disclosure on industry-physician financial relationships. Prior
to federal legislation on disclosure in 2014, several states enacted “sunshine laws” that required
companies to report payments to physicians (Brennan and Mello, 2007). In Massachusetts, Ver-
mont, and Minnesota, these disclosures were public (Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 111N, §6; Minn. Stat.
§151.461; Vt. Stat. tit. 18, §§4631-2.) and since 2009, many pharmaceutical companies have pub-
licly disclosed payment data for all 50 states (Merrill et al. 2013). Beginning in 2014, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act required disclosure of payments from pharmaceutical com-
panies to physicians and the compilation of this data into a publicly searchable online database
(42 C.F.R. §§ 402 and 403).
Critics of disclosure suggest that these laws stigmatize physicians who maintain collaborative
relationships with industry that are essential to innovation and product feedback (Sade 2011,
Sigworth et al. 2001, Santhakumar and Adashi 2015). Some contend that disclosure may have the
unintended consequences of moral licensing among physicians to conduct themselves in a biased
manner and/or of producing greater public trust in physicians who have received larger payments
(Cain et al. 2005, Loewenstein et al. 2012, Loewenstein et al. 2011, Koch and Schmidt 2010). Still
others claim that disclosure laws have limited effects on prescribing behavior (Pham-Kanter et al.
2012, Guo et al. 2017) and, as such, merely increase the cost of doing healthcare. Despite such
speculative arguments, however, the interaction of disclosure laws with the mediating channel of
industry-physician relationships remain unknown.
It is difficult to analyze the interaction of disclosure law with payments, and no previous
study has examined whether payments to physicians from pharmaceutical companies are lower
when disclosure is mandatory. Data for this type of comparative empirical analysis are rarely
available, have previously been of poor quality (Ross et al. 2007), and data are typically only
available for states that have instituted disclosure requirements. Researchers have had to rely on
physician self-reporting of payments in non-disclosure states. We bypass this obstacle by utilizing
national data released by pharmaceutical companies due to legal settlements unlikely to have
been predicted at the time physicians received payments.
The scope and size of our data also make it a more comprehensive industry-wide analysis.
Twelve U.S. pharmaceutical companies representing 42% of total pharmaceutical industry rev-
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enues released data on payments from 2009-2011 totaling to $316 million to 316,622 physicians
in 50 states and Washington, D.C. States were classified as having disclosure laws that were
strong (3 states-Massachusetts, Vermont, and Minnesota), weak (4 states-West Virginia, District
of Columbia, Maine, and California), or non-existent (44 states) based on whether data were
reported to state authorities (weak) or was made publicly available (strong). Our analysis of
state laws is limited by the lack of true randomization of laws or randomization of the assign-
ment of decision-makers responsible for creating the law. There is no way to rule out omitted
variables without a randomized control trial of laws, so our study faces the same limitation as
other studies of the impact of policies without random assignment. Thus, we use two approaches
in our analysis of disclosure laws and payments to physicians. First, we use a multiple regression
in a cross-sectional framework and assess whether our estimates change significantly with the
inclusion of controls that may be correlated with both the laws and the payments. Our second ap-
proach employs a differences-in-differences panel framework to control for unobserved differences
that are fixed within states. In both analyses, we find that state-mandated public disclosure of
pharmaceutical payments to physicians was associated with lower statewide average payment per
physician, but higher payments among the subset of physicians with industry relationships. The
quantitative estimates across all payments and for each payment category were similar, which
reduces the concern that our results are due to omitted variables, though we cannot completely
rule out that possibility.
For one state - Massachusetts - existing state-mandated disclosures first became publicly avail-
able during our sample period, allowing separate analyses of the association between disclosure
laws and public visibility of disclosed data while the administrative cost of reporting data re-
mained fixed for pharmaceutical companies. We use the date the data became publicly visible as
the treatment date for two reasons. First, this allows disentangling the behavioral response by
physicians to mandatory disclosure from the behavioral response by industry to the costs of com-
plying with mandatory disclosure. Second, we lack data covering the period before the date the
state-mandated disclosure data began to be collected. The results corroborate the cross-sectional
finding. While the number of payments to physicians decreases, the average amount of payments
increases among physicians who accepted payments. This suggests that the public visibility of the
disclosed data, rather than the disclosure itself, is the primary mechanism behind our findings.
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This is further corroborated by the fact that in our analysis states with weak disclosure laws are
indistinguishable from states with no disclosure laws.
On a theoretical level, our paper contributes to a literature on expert advisors. Many papers
have modeled the reputational concerns of expert advisors (Sobel 1985, Benabou and Laroque
1992, Morris 2001), but only two previous models, as far as we are aware, examine the effects
of mandatory disclosure (Li and Madarász 2008; Inderst and Ottaviani 2012). Li and Madarász
(2008) examines the effect of mandatory disclosure on the advice of experts, whereas we model the
effect of mandatory disclosure on the disclosed activity. Our model makes a technical contribution
by bounding the reduction in information rent accruing to remaining agents when less efficient
agents are shut down in an adverse selection model where outside opportunities increase. We
show that raising the opportunity cost of agents in an adverse selection model unambiguously
raises the payment to all types who still receive payments. Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) present
a different model where firms’ commissions (payments) to intermediaries steer the advice of
intermediaries and attract customers, but mandatory disclosure stifles all payments because it
reduces customers’ willingness to pay. However, Inderst and Ottaviani (2012) does not predict
mandatory disclosure to increase payments among those already receiving large payments. Our
paper also contributes to a large, primarily informal, mandatory disclosure literature in law (Ben-
Shahar and Schneider 2014), accounting (Leuz and Verrecchia 2000), and lobbying. A related
paper models the effects of third-party funding on the reputation of experts and, like this paper,
tests the model using confidential data (Chen 2015).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theory which provides intuition
for the potential effects of mandatory disclosure on the disclosed activity. Section 3 describes the
data. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy and threats to the validity of the identification
strategy. Section 5 presents the results. Section 6 discusses the findings and concludes.
2. THEORY
This section seeks to understand why disclosure laws may have behavioral effects. The following
is a simple theory for the potential impact of disclosure law on physician payments. First, the
payoff to paid physicians is predicted to increase after mandatory disclosure because of the
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reputational cost to physicians of having their industry-physician relationships be made public.
Second, physicians receiving low payments drop out with mandatory disclosure because it is not
worth it to the pharmaceutical companies to continue paying these physicians. We illustrate the
intuition in a two-type model and a full model with continuous types in the online appendix.
In brief, suppose each physician can be categorized according to a certain number of ways
in which they may increase pharmaceutical sales. For example, some physicians may be more
successful at conducting clinical research that advance marketing claims or find additional indi-
cations for a particular drug. Other physicians may be more effective at presenting the results
of clinical research to colleagues and affecting peer prescribing behaviors. Some physicians may
simply be more behaviorally responsive to payments in their prescribing patterns. The pharma-
ceutical company’s objective, for a given physician type, is to maximize the payoff of payments.
The payoff for effective physicians will be higher than the payoff for less effective physicians.
Now, consider the effect of disclosure. We assume that disclosure law increases the cost of
each physician for the pharmaceutical company. Disclosure effectively makes physicians more
reluctant to accept payments. The reputational cost of accepting payments is passed onto the
pharmaceutical company, which then must make higher individual payments to achieve the same
effect with a particular physician. Then, mandatory disclosure has two effects. First, mandatory
disclosure increases the payoffs to the paid physicians, because for a given physician effort, the
payment to the physician increases. Second, mandatory disclosure increases the cutoff threshold
for physician effectiveness. The pharmaceutical company will choose not to pay physicians who
are less effective than this cutoff. So, mandatory disclosure causes low payments to drop out.
3. DATA
We identified payments to physicians between 2009-2011 using public disclosures from 12 phar-
maceutical companies. The combined revenue of the companies represented 42% of U.S. market
revenue in 2011.1 Two companies made payment data available voluntarily, and data from the
remaining 10 companies became available due to legal action – typically as a result of legal
settlements with the U.S. Department of Justice.2 These data were collated and provided by a
1Appendix 1, which reports background information on these companies, displays this information in Panel A.
2Appendix 1 Panel B summarizes the conditions for each pharmaceutical company disclosing the payments.
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non-profit journalism organization, ProPublica. We conducted several validation checks of the
data. First, we validated this database with data obtained directly from seven pharmaceuti-
cal companies. ProPublica assembled data on payments to physicians from 12 pharmaceutical
companies, between the third quarter of 2009 and fourth quarter of 2011. This compilation was
important because historical data are not easily obtainable from all pharmaceutical companies
directly. For example, some companies remove data from their website at the end of each quarter
or year. We partially validate the quality of the ProPublica data, by comparing it with data ob-
tained directly from Eli Lilly, for payments made to physicians during 2010. We found a match
of greater than or equal 97.5% for the number of physicians and total amount of payments,
in each category and overall. Similarly high match rates were found for Astrazeneca payments
made in 2010, GlaxoSmithKline payments made in 2009 Quarters 2 to 4, Johnson & Johnson
payments made in 2010, Merck payments made from 2009 Quarter 3 to 2010 Quarter 4, Valeant
payments made in 2010 Quarters 1 to 3, and Viiv payments made in 2010.3 Other data were
not reported in a quarterly or yearly time frame available for comparison. When we excluded
voluntarily disclosed data in robustness checks of our specifications, the results were similar.
Our data contained 579,652 payments made from the third quarter of 2009 to second quarter
of 2011. We also excluded 707 payments for which an individual recipient could not be identified.
316,622 physicians and $316 million in payments were represented in our data. Each payment
included the name of the pharmaceutical company providing payment, name and city of the
physician receiving payment, date, amount, and category of payment (consulting, speaking, re-
search, meals, travel/lodging, items, other, or combination of above categories). We cannot verify
whether pharmaceutical companies assigned the most relevant payment category to transactions,
as contract terms are typically private and may include provision of promotional or marketing
support (Steinbrook 2009).
If a payment range was specified (e.g., “$10,001-$20,000”), the average reported payment within
that range was used. Most companies reported data at the annual level, so we generated equivalent
data for the remaining companies by summing the payments by year. Physician identifiers were
created based on the same name (first, last, and middle) and city appearing in multiple disclosure
records. For a match across payment records, we required the same first and last name, and either
3Appendix 1 Panel C presents a full discussion of the validity of our data.
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the same middle name (or initial) or city; no other data were available for the match.
Various governmental and non-profit organizations provided data on statewide health and
socioeconomic conditions.4
We classified state disclosure laws as “strong” if states required payments to physicians to
be publicly available, “weak” if states required payments to physicians to be reported to the
state but not the general public, and “none” if states did not require reporting of payments
to physicians. Table 1 summarizes the dates of passage of laws and categorizes the strength of
disclosure laws by state. In Massachusetts, payments from drug companies and medical device
makers to healthcare providers were required to be disclosed to the general public. In Minnesota,
payments of over $100 from wholesale drug manufacturers to practitioners were required to be
generally disclosed to the public. In Vermont, payments from prescription drug companies to
healthcare providers were required to be disclosed to the general public. In Massachusetts, the
data became publicly searchable on a website in November 2010. For Minnesota and Vermont, the
data can be requested from the state attorney general offices. In West Virginia, payments above
$100 from drug companies to healthcare providers, for the purpose of advertising prescription
drugs were disclosed to the state. In Maine and the District of Columbia, payments for seminars,
informational programs, trips and travel, food, entertainment, or gifts valued at more than $25
and anything provided to a healthcare professional for less than market value were required to
be disclosed to the state. In California, pharmaceutical companies are required to self-impose
an annual limit on marketing expenses to healthcare professionals. In West Virginia, District of
Columbia, Maine, and California, any payment data disclosed to the state was kept confidential.
3.1. Outcomes
The main dependent variable was the log of average payments per year5, calculated as the
total annual amount paid to all physicians in a state each year (“statewide payments”) divided
by the number of physicians with active licenses in each state (“number of active physicians”).
In additional tests, we examined the share of statewide payments in each category and number
of physicians accepting any payment. We also analyzed annual payments to individual physi-
4These variables are listed along with their sources in Appendix 2.
5We used logs because distribution of payments was more reflective of log-normal rather than normal distribution.
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cians among the subset of physicians who accepted at least one payment (“paid physicians”) as
well as the distribution of payments above and below $1,000 and $100 – the limit on indus-
try gifts to physicians suggested by both the AMA (1992) and Pharmaceutical Researchers and
Manufacturers of America (2009).
3.2. Potential Confounders
We control for potential confounders that may influence the interest of pharmaceutical compa-
nies in associating with physicians in these states. Physicians earning a lower income or residing
in states with a higher cost of living may have greater interest to supplement income through
payments from pharmaceutical companies. Special considerations may be taken into account
when prescribing medications for children (differential safety, dosage, duration, etc.); a large
elderly population is likely to reflect a bigger market share for prescription drugs, increasing
the interest of pharmaceutical companies to associate with physicians in these states. Individu-
als with health insurance, higher wealth, or education may be more able to afford prescription
medications. Bigger prescription drug market size, dense populations, and more physicians with
active licenses may make pharmaceutical associations more effective, for example, through more
interaction with other physicians on a regular basis, whether casual or through well-attended
speaking engagements. Nurses with active licenses may be an alternative target of association
for pharmaceutical companies. We obtain cost of living, average physician wages, median house-
hold income, and the proportion of individuals with health insurance from the US Departments
of Labor and Commerce. We measure population density and the proportion of individuals under
18 years of age, greater than or equal to 65 years, and with at least a high school education from
the U.S. Census Bureau. The Kaiser Family Foundation provided data on the average number of
retail prescriptions per person that were filled at pharmacies in 2011. The AMA and American
Hospital Association provided data on the number of physicians and nurses in each state with
active licenses, respectively.
In robustness checks, we used sparse models to assist in the selection of controls (Belloni et al.,
2014, Belloni et al. 2012). Controlling for a large set of variables is desirable from the standpoint
of mitigating potential biases underlying the interpretation of the disclosure law coefficient. The
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downside is that controlling for too many variables may make estimates become less precise. The
researchers are faced with a trade-off between the precision of the estimate and the plausibility
of the conditional exogeneity assumption. By including additional controls in the specification,
we make the conditional exogeneity assumption more plausible. At the same time, the precision
of estimates is potentially reduced. The double selection method by LASSO offers a rigorous
approach to achieving a balance between exogeneity and precision (Belloni et al., 2014, Belloni
et al. 2012).6
Formally, LASSO modifies ordinary least squares by minimizing the sum of squared errors sub-
ject to the sum of the absolute value of all coefficients being less than a constant. This constraint
tends to set some coefficients to exactly 0, reducing model complexity by identifying only the
most important variables. Estimation proceeded in two steps. First, LASSO selected the control
variables that predict the strength of the disclosure law. This step helps to ensure robustness by
finding control variables that are strongly related to the treatment and thus potentially important
confounds. Next, LASSO selected control variables that were predictive of payments. This step
helps to ensure that important elements are included in the equation, helping keep the residual
variance small as well as intuitively providing an additional chance to find important confounds.
LASSO used a set of potential confounding factors constructed from the original controls and, as
6Determining which variables to select as controls is a frequent problem in observational studies. Typically,
intuition suggests a set of variables that might be important but does not identify exactly which variables are
important or the variables’ functional forms and interactions. This lack of clear guidance about which variables
to use leaves researchers with the problem of attempting to select a sensible set of controls from a potentially
vast set of variables. As such, LASSO may be a useful tool to strengthen observational studies in the clinical
literature. The basic problem in estimating the relationship between disclosure law and pharmaceutical company
payments to physicians is that disclosure law is likely endogenous to important economic or social factors. These
factors may be associated with both the strength of the disclosure law and pharmaceutical company payments. If
these factors are important, they could drive a spurious association between disclosure law and pharmaceutical
company payments. We assess the stability of coefficients to including obvious confounding factors, such as the
existence of persistent state-to-state differences in policies, demographics, and culture that are probably related
to disclosure laws and the overall level of pharmaceutical company payments to physicians (either by modifying
the desirability of physicians to pharmaceutical company marketers or the willingness of physicians to accept
payments from pharmaceutical companies). It is also important to control flexibly for state-to-state differences.
Interpreting correlations from our basic specification as unbiased relies on the belief that there are no higher-
order terms of the control variables, no interaction terms, and no additional excluded variables that are associated
both to disclosure laws and pharmaceutical company payments to physicians. Interpretation also relies on the
belief that payments do not lead to different types of disclosure laws. While this must be ruled out on a priori
grounds, justifying the belief of no omitted variables requires more work. LASSO complements the usual careful
specification analysis by providing a researcher a simple-to-implement, data-driven way to search for a set of
influential confounds from among a sensibly chosen broader set of potential confounding variables. Empirical
studies usually rely on a sensitivity analysis to report results for several different sets of controls, to show that
the parameter of interest is robust to changes in the set of control variables. The tables in Appendices 3 and 7
reports the results using LASSO to select potential confounders, and the result of this selection is reported in
Appendix 8.
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standard practice, all two-way interactions between any two controls.7 The original controls plus
LASSO-selected control variables were then included as independent variables.8 LASSO is not a
perfect solution to omitted-variables bias: the cross-sectional regressions can still be misleading
to the extent that important confounding factors are left out of the feature set, hence the need
for a difference-in-difference approach to complement the cross-sectional approach.
4. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK
4.1. Cross-sectional specification
Our multiple regression model used the following framework:
(1) log(Yst) =  0 +  1Lawst +  2Y eart +  3Xst + ✏st,
where Yst is the ratio of sum of all payments received, over the number of active physicians
in state s, year t.9 Lawst are dummy variables indicating strength of disclosure laws in state
s, year t (strong, weak, or none (the omitted category)); Y eart is a dummy for each year in
our sample; and Xst are state and year controls, including the share of payments from each
company, the share of payments for each category of payment, and health and socioeconomic
controls as described above. We use heteroscedasticity-robust Huber-White standard errors or
standard errors clustered at the state level.
For alternative specifications, we also looked at:
(2) log(Yist) =  0 +  1Lawst +  2Y eart +  3Xst + ✏ist
7Additional description of and motivation for the LASSO variables are in Cohen and Chen (2010).
8We also included Share of Payments from Each Pharmaceutical Company by Value and by Count and Share of
Payments in each Payment Category by Value and by Count. However, all results at the state and physician level
and at various thresholds were robust to dropping control variables for share of payments from each company and
share of payments for each category of payment. In fact, the relationships became larger and more statistically
significant.
9We specified payments in logs because we rejected the hypothesis that payments in non-log terms were normally
distributed using the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test against the theoretical distribution.
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where Yist is now sum of all payments received by physician i in state s, year t, and the
right-hand side variables having the same notation as the aggregate version. When we analyze
payments above or below cutoffs like $1,000 and $100, we check robustness of the results to
implementing truncated regressions.10
Finally, for the third specification, we looked at:
(3) log(Ycst) =  0 +  1Lawst +  2Y eart +  3Xst + ✏cst,
where now Ycst is the sum of category c payments received, divided by the sum of all payments
in state s, and year t.
4.2. Differences-in-differences specification
For the differences-in-differences specification, we used the following framework:
(4) log(Yst) =  0 +  1 M + 2 M Postt +  3Y eart +  4Xst + ✏st,
where Yst is the sum of all payments, over the number of active physicians in state s, year t;
M is an indicator variable for the state of Massachusetts; Y eart and Xst are as defined before;
the year fixed effects absorb the post dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
As an alternative specification, we also consider:
(5) log(Yist) =  0 +  1 M + 2 M Postt +  3Y eart +  4Xst + ✏ist,
where Yist is now sum of all payments received by physician i in state s, year t, and the
right-hand side variables having the same notation as the aggregate version.
10To reduce the impact of outliers, we also replaced the top 0.5% of payments with the 99.5th percentile. We
varied this parameter between the top 0.5% and 2.5%, with similar results. Results were robust to eliminating
payments reported in ranges.
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To assess the validity of our estimates, we used randomization inference: we re-ran these re-
gressions, re-assigning the indicator variable to another state. We report whether the true  2
falls outside the 90 or 95% range of placebo  2 estimates. There is no pre-trend data to assess
parallel pre-trends before the data were revealed online because most of the data is yearly. In the
appendix, we employ synthetic control and report point estimates similar to the main estimates.
5. RESULTS
5.1. Cross-sectional association between disclosure laws and payments (state-level analysis)
We preview our results with mean statistics and distributional visualizations before moving to
the regression analyses. First, we looked at differences in payments between states with strong,
weak, and no disclosure laws. We compared the magnitude and category of payments according
to disclosure status. Table 2 presents summary statistics. In the bottom the first panel, 11%
of physicians in strong-disclosure states accepted payments, versus 37% and 42% of physicians
in states with weak and no disclosure laws, respectively. Among the 316,622 physicians11 who
accepted payments across the U.S., the average annual payment was $1,377 (standard devia-
tion=$6,694).12 The second panel displays the average payments per physician in the different
states. It shows that statewide payments per physicians is $221 in strong-disclosure states and
$334 in weak-disclosure states and $411 in non-disclosure states. Speaking fees comprise the
largest share across all categories and states. It also shows that strong-disclosure states have
lower average payments for speaking and for meals and higher payments for consulting. The
third panel displays the average payments per paid physician in the different states. It shows
that physicians in strong-disclosure states had proportionately larger payments for consulting.
The absolute payment amount for research activities is larger in strong-disclosure states. The
fourth panel displays the proportional distribution of payments across payment types for differ-
ent categories of disclosure law strength. It shows similar patterns are also present in terms of
proportions.
Figure 1 displays the cumulative density of payments by strength of disclosure law. It displays
11316,622 = 6,689 + 38,209 + 271,724 from the third row of this panel.
12This is the weighted average of the final row of the third panel.
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annual payments among paid physicians (observations are at the physician-year level). The cu-
mulative density line for states with no disclosure law and for states with weak disclosure law
indicates that in both groups of states, 90% of the annual payments among paid physicians
are below $1000. This can be seen by drawing a vertical line at $1000 on the x-axis. When
Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont are averaged, 81% of the physicians in these states
were paid less than $1000 annually. Massachusetts – the state with the most recent implemen-
tation of a strong disclosure law – exhibited the lowest proportion of paid physicians receiving
payments greater than $1,000 among strong-disclosure states and diverged least from weak and
non-disclosure states in this regard. States under strong disclosure laws for longer periods of time
had higher proportions of highly paid physicians. The distributions were significantly different
at P=0.001.
Figure 1 also presents the analyses of Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Vermont separately
in order to examine the $100 cut-off. The disclosure obligations in one strong disclosure state
(Minnesota) and one weak disclosure state (West Virginia) required payments of over $100 to be
reported to the public or state attorney general offices. However, litigation settlements obliged
all payments to be reported. To the extent the administrative burdens surrounding payments in
excess of $100 and lack of administrative burdens for payments under $100 meant that payments
under $100 should be more common (than in states without disclosure obligations), this is not
apparent in the data. Up to 60% of annual physician payments are less than $100 in Minnesota,
which is in between the percentage share for the other two strong disclosure states (Massachusetts
and Vermont), which is suggestive evidence that administrative burden of reporting was not a
significant determinant of the payments. However, the derivative in the cumulative distribution is
highest for Minnesota at $100, while the distribution of payments for West Virginia is very similar
to the distribution of payments for no disclosure states. This difference-in-discontinuity supports
the view that disclosure affects the reputational costs to physicians, who would discontinuously
experience this cost at $100 and only in strong disclosure states.
We used multiple regression models to relate physician payments to the presence of strong,
weak, or no disclosure laws, controlling for the pharmaceutical company providing payment,
category of payment, year, and controls described above. The unit of analysis is the state-year
with 153 observations across 3 years. Adjusted for all controls, statewide payments per physician
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were 49% lower in strong-disclosure states (95% CI=-0.716,-0.259, P<0.001, Table 3) than in
non-disclosure states. Statewide payments were not significantly lower in weak-disclosure states
(coefficient=-0.176, 95% CI=-0.394,0.041, P=0.11) (Table 3) than in non-disclosure states. Both
of these results are consistent with regression models that include different sets of potential
confounds.13
Using multiple regression models, we also estimated the relationship between disclosure laws
and the share of payments in each category, and the relationship between disclosure laws and
the number of physicians receiving payments. Compared to total payments per category in non-
disclosure states, adjusted for all controls, the share of total payments per category in strong-
disclosure states was as follows: 10.5% lower share for speaking (P=0.005), 3.1% lower share for
meals (P=0.05), and 9.4% higher share for consulting (P<0.001)14. Weak-disclosure states had,
in contrast, a 2.8% higher share of payments for meals and 2.1% lower share of payments for
consulting than in non-disclosure states (both P=0.05). A chi-squared test of differences between
payment categories by strength of disclosure laws was significant (P<0.001).
5.2. Cross-sectional association between disclosure laws and payments (physician-level analysis)
Next, we analyzed the association between disclosure laws and payments received by physicians
at the individual (rather than state) level. The unit of analysis is physician-year. Table 3, column
2 considers the subset of physicians who accepted any payment from pharmaceutical companies.
In strong-disclosure states, annual payments among physicians who accepted any payment were
10.1% higher (95% CI=0.0096-0.193, P=0.03) than in non-disclosure states. This result is robust
to various sets of controls.15 Average annual payments among physicians who accepted any
payments was $2,436 in strong-disclosure states and $1,340 in non-disclosure state (and $1,467
in weak-disclosure states). In weak-disclosure states, annual payments were 8.8% lower (P<0.001)
than in non-disclosure states, but the sign of this association was reversed in specifications with
fewer controls.
We evaluated different thresholds for payments to ascertain the parts of the payment distribu-
13Appendix 3 displays a sequence of models where control variables are gradually added to assess sensitivity of
the main results.
14Appendix 4 reports the complete set of regression coefficients.
15Appendix 3 sequentially adds controls in models 7-9.
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tion that were associated with disclosure laws. Doing so assesses a prediction of the model. The
model says that (1) low-money physicians simply drop out and (2) high-money physicians get
more money. We used a multiple regression analysis similar to the aggregate approach. The unit
of analysis is physician-year. Some specifications include only physician-years when a physician
received any payments. Other specifications include all active physician-years, assigning $0 to
physicians not receiving payments.
In strong-disclosure states, annual payments among physicians who accepted greater than
$100/year were 54% higher (95% CI=0.411-0.675, P<0.001) (Table 3, column 3) than in non-
disclosure states. No statistically significant association was observed between strong disclosure
laws and the number of physicians who accepted greater than $100/year. However, in strong-
disclosure states, roughly 19% of paid physicians accepted payments greater than $1,000, com-
pared with only 10% of physicians in weak-disclosure states and non-disclosure states. States
with less time spent under strong disclosure laws had a smaller percentage of paid physicians
accepting payments greater than $1,000.
No statistically significant association was observed for strong disclosure laws and size of pay-
ments among paid physicians who accepted less than or equal to $100/year, but the number of
such physicians was 68% lower (95% CI=0.058-1.294, P=0.032)16 than in non-disclosure states.
When including all physicians (not just those who received payments), annual payments among
physicians who accepted less than or equal to $100/year were 25% lower (95% CI=0.249-0.260,
P<0.001) (Table 3, column 4). Payments among physicians who accepted less than or equal
to $100/year were significantly different in states with weak versus no disclosure laws, but the
significance disappears in the truncated regression with clustering at the state level.17
5.3. Differences-in-differences association between disclosure laws and payments (physician-level
analysis)
One state in our sample, Massachusetts, enacted a strong disclosure law in January 2009, but
first publicly released data in November 2010 (Kowalczyk 2010). To examine the impact of this
16Appendix 5, which reports additional analyses of the relationship between disclosure laws and distribution of
payments to physicians, shows this result in column 2.
17Appendix 7, which reports additional analyses of the relationship between disclosure laws and payments to
physicians, shows this result in column 4.
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release, we ran a differences-in-differences analysis that compared the change in payments in
Massachusetts pre- versus post-November 2010 with the change in payments in all other states
(none of which altered transparency during this time period). Units of analysis are state-year
and physician-year.
Following public release of disclosed payments, payments per physician in Massachusetts de-
creased 36% (P<0.001) (Table 3, column 5) relative to all other states (which did not change
publication of disclosures during this time period). The share of Massachusetts payments de-
clined by 7% for speaking and 4% for meals, but rose 9% for research and 1% for consulting (the
first three P<0.001 and the last P<0.1).18 However, because of the large decrease in payments
per physician overall, the absolute amount within each of the categories was reduced. When we
used randomization inference, re-assigning the indicator variable to each of the other states, the
estimated decrease for overall payments, meals, travel, was between the 90th and 95th percentile
of the alternative estimates.
Although not statistically significant, the number of Massachusetts physicians receiving any
payment and payments less than $100 declined 34% (P=0.112) and 13% (P=0.125), respectively.
Payments among Massachusetts physicians who accepted greater than $100/year increased 69%
(P<0.001) while payments among those who accepted less than $100/year decreased by 6.9%
(P<0.001) (Table 3, columns 6-7) relative to all other states. When we re-assigned the indicator
variable to each of the other states, the estimated decrease in payments among those who accepted
less than $100/year was between the 90th and 95th percentile of the alternative estimates.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Many hope that disclosure policies will result in more evidence-based prescribing decisions,
better patient outcomes, and decreases in total expenditures on prescription drugs – the fastest
growing component of healthcare costs. However, the interaction of disclosure laws on the medi-
ating channel of industry-physician relationships remains unknown. This paper presents a model
of the potential impact of disclosure law on the disclosed activity. These effects have not been pre-
viously modeled as far as we are aware nor have they been empirically examined. The interaction
18The regression analyses of Massachusetts’ disclosure is shown in Appendix 6.
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of disclosure laws on the targeted behavior is typically unknowable since data on disclosed ac-
tivity rarely exist in the absence of disclosure. We bypass this obstacle by utilizing national data
released by pharmaceutical companies due to legal settlements unlikely to have been predicted
at the time physicians received payments.
Strong disclosure laws were associated with a 49% lower statewide annual average of payments
to physicians and 74% lower proportion of physicians receiving payments. These decreases might
be considered an intended result of disclosure legislation. However, among physicians who ac-
cepted any payment, annual payments were 10% higher in strong-disclosure states, and payments
were 54% higher among physicians who accepted more than $100/yr.
Physicians in strong-disclosure states had proportionately smaller payments for speaking and
for meals and larger payments for consulting. The absolute payment amount for research activities
is larger in strong-disclosure states. These observations suggest that rather than stigmatizing
industry-physician research relationships, public disclosure of payments may instead encourage
explicit and formal delineation of industry-physician relationships around consulting, research
and development activities.
Little association was observed between payments to physicians and disclosure laws that did
not mandate disclosure of payments to the public. This finding may explain the limited effects of
disclosure laws in West Virginia and Maine on prescribing behavior in two drug classes observed
in a recent study (Pham-Kanter et al. 2012). The disclosure requirements in the Affordable Care
Act, however, are more similar to the strong disclosure laws in our study.
Our results shed light on whether the interaction of disclosure law with the targeted behavior
is mediated through administrative costs imposed on industry or through physicians’ willing-
ness to accept payments (our model highlights the reputational cost to physicians of having
their industry-physician relationships made public). Two considerations suggest that adminis-
trative costs imposed on industry are the lesser of the two mechanisms in our results. First,
strong and weak disclosure imposes similar administrative costs. Second, the changes observed
in Massachusetts after public release of disclosures were similar to the smaller payments noted
for strong disclosure states. In addition, the categories of payments shifted in the same way–more
in consulting and research and less in speaking and meals in strong disclosure states–using both
cross-sectional and longitudinal variation. These results suggest that the reduction of incidental
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payments was due to decreased willingness among physicians to accept payments and that the
cost of compliance with disclosure requirements did not significantly reduce industry willingness
to maintain payment relationships with physicians. Moreover, to the extent that weak disclosure
laws can theoretically have other behavioral effects, such as expressive or moral effects that can
be reflected in payments, we do not observe them in the data.
Third, higher payments for paid physicians were observed when physician payments were pub-
licly visible. This result is consistent with physician-level factors such as compensation demanded
for increased public visibility and associated reputational costs (Sigworth et al. 2001) or a “com-
pensation race” driven by physicians demanding more for their contracts, the availability of infor-
mation on colleagues’ compensation, and being under-paid (Preker 2007) or a sense of entitlement
(Lichter 2008). The observed changes may be due to a compositional shift in the physicians re-
ceiving payments or a change in payments within physicians. When we include physician fixed
effects, which utilizes doctors’ pre-period payment receipts, strong disclosure was associated with
higher payments per physician, but the association was not statistically significant at conven-
tional levels. Therefore, some of the differences may be due to composition effects or treatment
effects. It is possible that in some instances, physicians who previously received large payments
now receive larger payments, and that in other instances, new physicians began receiving the
larger payments.
We only had data from 12 pharmaceutical companies and to some extent, the analysis relies
on the assumption that the variation in laws is uncorrelated with variation in sampling; however,
the 12 companies included 7 of the 10 largest firms in the U.S. market, making their activities
relevant even if not representative of smaller pharmaceutical firms.19 Lower payments per physi-
cian in strong disclosure states were observed for each of the 12 companies regardless of its size.
This alleviates the concern that sampling factors are associated with the identifying variation
if the same pattern holds for each company. We also compared the distribution of payments
by companies in the ProPublica database and by companies not in the ProPublica database
using data from Massachusetts – A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for significant differences in
distributions indicates that the two distributions are not significantly different (P=0.20).
19Analysis of the entire pharmaceutical company industry is the subject of ERC-funded work by one of the authors
using data from the ACA-mandated industry-wide disclosure.
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The main results were similar using both cross-sectional and longitudinal variation. We ex-
amined the experience of Massachusetts before and after the state publicly released data on
pharmaceutical company payments to physicians. We employed advanced statistical techniques
for strengthening cross-sectional studies by using LASSO, a sparse model, to select control vari-
ables predictive of the strength of disclosure law and control variables predictive of payments.
Results were similar in both the figures displaying the raw data and multiple regressions that
included controls.
Finally, although we conducted our regression analysis for differences between small and large
amounts at $100, other cutoffs besides $100 do not change the findings as indicated by our visual
representation of the cumulative distribution of payments. In strong disclosure states, there are
fewer small payments even if we draw the cut-off elsewhere. We also did not observe payments
under $100 to be more common in states with administrative burdens to disclose payments in
excess of $100 compared to states without disclosure obligations. Payments under $100 are not
more common in two states with administrative burdens to disclose payments in excess of $100,
further suggestive that administrative burden of reporting was not a significant determinant
of the payments. Notably, the derivative in the cumulative distribution is highest at $100 for
the strong disclosure state but not the weak disclosure state. The difference-in-discontinuity
also supports the view that disclosure affects the reputational costs to physicians, who would
discontinuously experience this cost at $100 and only in strong disclosure states.
Questions for future research concern the association between pharmaceutical company pay-
ments, prescribing behavior, and patient outcomes.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Pharmaceutical Company Payments to Physicians, by Strength  
of Disclosure Laws, 2009-2011. 
 
  Strength of Disclosure Laws 








N States  3 4 44 
  N Active Physicians* 43,820 109,041 646,630 
N Paid Physicians  6,689 38,209 271,724 
  N Payments 11,039 69,759 498,147 
 
Number of Physicians Accepting Any 
Payment / Number of Active Physicians (%)** 
10.73 36.56 42.31 
 
Average Annual Statewide Payments / Number of Active Physicians 
$ Consulting 33.52 15.92 18.91 
 Speaking 130.34 233.09 255.71 
 Research 30.91 35.30 68.49 
 Meals 3.91 24.37 26.18 
 Travel/Lodging 12.60 14.76 16.34 
 Items 0.82 2.43 2.88 
 Other 3.94 8.66 12.62 
 Total 220.85 334.40 411.45 
 
Average Annual Payments / Physician, Among Physicians Who Accepted Any Payment 
$ Consulting 1046.49 314.79 282.96 
 Speaking 3692.35 2909.10 2855.72 
 Research 1030.37 150.26 207.20 
 Meals 43.87 67.51 56.77 
 Travel/Lodging 203.49 79.63 53.92 
 Items 7.20 4.47 4.20 
 Other 354.05 466.93 470.89 
 Total  2436.35 1466.84 1340.24 
     
Share of Statewide Payments 
% Consulting 15.38 5.79 5.05 
 Speaking 53.59 64.28 61.74 
 Research 22.23 13.94 18.92 
 Meals 1.33 7.03 5.58 
 Travel/Lodging 4.11 3.38 3.01 
 Items 0.17 0.38 0.45 
 Other 2.53 4.05 4.26 
     
Year 2009 7.32 3.49 3.59 
 2010 64.33 60.95 61.65 
 2011 28.35 35.56 34.75 
    
Statewide Variables    
Real Income Per Capita ($)* 29,781     29,095     26,782 
Average Physician Wage ($) 194,797     190,758      188,748     
Cost of Living 
Index 
 115.32 121.33 102.86 
Population < 18 y (%) 21.99 21.59 24.25 
Population ≥ 65 y (%) 13.59 13.58 13.05 
≥ High School Education (%) 90.84 85.24 87.12 
Health Insurance (%) 76.96 68.28 71.11 
Number of Retail Prescriptions Filled at 
Pharmacies (Person/Year) 
12.23 13.15 12.14 
Population Density (Thousands/Square Mile) 249.10 2298.41 162.06 
Number of Physicians with Active Licenses 14,607 27,260 14,696 
Number of Nurses with Active Licenses 43,933 67,815 45,775 
 
*Data for 2010. 
**Average per state. 
 
  





Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
          
      { Difference in Payments Between MA and All Other 
States, Before and After Public Release of MA 
Payments }† 
         






State-Year Physician-Year Physician-Year 
         





































         
Independent Variable          
Disclosure Laws With 
Public Reporting (“Strong”) 
-0.488*** 0.101* 0.543*** -0.254***    
P   <0.001 0.0304 <0.001 <0.001    








   
          
Disclosure Laws Without 
Public Reporting (“Weak”) 
-0.176 -0.0880*** 0.036 -0.0613***    
P   0.111 <0.001 0.34 <0.001    








   
          
Massachusetts x After 
Public Release in MA 
    -0.356*** 0.691*** -0.0686*** 
P       <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(95% CI)      (-0.465, -0.247) (0.605, 0.778) (-0.0846,  
-0.0527) 
          
N   153 425,797 139,019 2,257,059 153 141,736 2,257,059 
R2   0.99 0.215 0.172 0.099 0.972 0.170 0.098 
±Adjusted for company providing payment, category of payment, year, and statewide demographics. Demographics are 
household income, average physician wage, cost of living, % population < 18, % population ≥ 65, % unemployment, % ≥ high 
school education, % health insurance, annual prescription drugs filled at pharmacies/person, population density, number of 
active physicians, and number of active nurses.  Full results displayed in Appendix 3.  Additional LASSO controls in Appendix 8.  
Robust standard errors. 
‡Included a zero for physicians who accepted no payments. 
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Appendix 1. Disclosure of Pharmaceutical Company Payments to Physicians 
 
Panel A: Size of Database, May 2012 
Company Revenue 
($ Billion, 2011) 
Market Capitalization 
($ Billion, May 2, 2012) 
Allergan 5.42 29.37 
AstraZeneca 33.59 56.25 
Cephalon* 18.31 43.08 
Eli Lilly 24.29 47.86 
EMD Serono** N/A N/A 
GlaxoSmithKline 43.93 117.82 
Johnson & Johnson 65.03 179.03 
Merck 48.05 119.79 
Novartis 58.57 151.26 
Pfizer 67.43 171.7 
Valeant 2.46 16.79 
ViiV** N/A N/A 
Total of Companies in Data 367.08 932.95 
Size of Pharmaceutical Market 869.85 2,090.00 
Market Share 42.2% 44.6% 
*Data shown for Teva, which acquired Cephalon in 2011. 
*Private company; data not available. 
**Owned by GlaxoSmithKline and Pfizer. 
 
Sources: 
Global Industry Classification Standard. Health Care-Pharmaceuticals-Pharmaceuticals. New York, NY: MSCI and 
Standard and Poor's, 1999. Accessed at http://www.msci.com/products/indices/sector/gics/, May 2, 2012. 
Bloomberg LP, Accessed at www.bloomberg.com, May 2, 2012. 
 
 
Panel B: Categories of Paym
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Appendix 1 Panel C: Validation of ProPublica Data with Data Obtained Directly from One 
Pharmaceutical Company, for One Year 
 
ProPublica assembled data on payments to physicians from 12 pharmaceutical companies, 
between the third quarter of 2009 and fourth quarter of 2011. This compilation was important because 
historical data are not easily obtainable from all pharmaceutical companies directly. For example, some 
companies remove data from their website at the end of each quarter or year. 
To partially validate the quality of the ProPublica data, we compared it with data obtained 
directly from Eli Lilly, for payments made to physicians during 2010. We found a match of ≥97.5% for 
the number of physicians and total amount of payments, in each category and overall. Similarly high 
match rates were found for Astrazeneca payments made in 2010, GlaxoSmithKline payments made in 
2009 Quarters 2 to 4, Johnson & Johnson payments made in 2010, Merck payments made from 2009 
Quarter 3 to 2010 Quarter 4, Valeant payments made in 2010 Quarters 1 to 3, and Viiv payments made in 
2010. Other data were not reported in a quarterly or yearly time frame available for comparison. 
 
ProPublica data for payments from Eli Lilly during 2010 
 Speaking Consulting Travel Other Total 
Number of Physicians 3,727 1,005 3,683 864 9,279 
Total Amount ($) 61,477,547 4,114,517 5,205,539 7,065,820 77,863,092 
 
Data obtained directly from Eli Lilly for payments during 2010 
(Eli Lilly and Company. Physician Payment Registry. Q1-Q4 2010 Lilly Faculty Registry. Accessed at 
http://www.lillyphysicianpaymentregistry.com/Registry/Archives, August 30, 2012) 
 Speaking Consulting Travel Other Total 
Number of Physicians 3,743 1,016 3,701 867 9,327 
Total Amount ($) 61,925,592 4,218,849 5,232,081 7,092,908 78,469,430 
 
ProPublica data / Data obtained directly from Eli Lilly for payments during 2010 
 Speaking Consulting Travel Other Total 
Number of Physicians 99.6% 98.9% 99.5% 99.7% 99.5% 
Total Amount ($) 99.3% 97.5% 99.5% 99.6% 99.2% 
Appendix 2. Description of State-level Variables Used as Controls in Regression Analysis 
 
Real Income Per Capita ($) 
Definition: Household income, 2010 / Consumer Price Index [an adjustment for inflation since 2001] 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Rationale: Wealthier people may be more able afford prescription drugs but have fewer health problems 
(decreasing their need to purchase prescription drugs). Both factors may influence the interest of 
pharmaceutical companies in associating with physicians in these states. 
 
Average Physician Wage ($) 
Definition: Average physician and surgeon wage, 2010 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational and Employment Statistics, 
Occupational Employment and Wages, 29-1069 Physicians and Surgeons, All Other 
Rationale: Physicians earning a higher income may have less need to supplement income through 
payments from pharmaceutical companies. 
 
Cost of Living Index 
Definition: Consumer price index in state, 2010 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Rationale: Physicians in states with a higher cost of living may need extra income (e.g., payments from 
pharmaceutical companies) to meet their expenses. 
 
Population < 18 y (%) 
Definition: Population aged <18  years / Total population, 2010 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 
Rationale: Special considerations may be taken into account when prescribing medications for children 
(differential safety, dosage, duration, etc.). These issues may affect the interest of pharmaceutical 
companies in associating with physicians in states with a large proportion of children.  
 
Population ≥ 65 y (%) 
Definition: Population aged ≥ 65 years / Total population, 2010 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 
Rationale: States with a large elderly population may have a bigger market share for prescription drugs, 
increasing the interest of pharmaceutical companies to associate with physicians in these states. 
 
≥ High School Education (%) 
Definition: Population with at least a high school education / Total population, 2010 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 
Rationale: More educated persons may have a higher income, increasing their ability to afford 
prescription drugs. On the other hand, more educated persons may have fewer health problems, 
decreasing their need to purchase prescription drugs. Both factors may influence the interest of 
pharmaceutical companies in associating with physicians in these states. 
 
Health Insurance (%) 
Definition: Population aged 18-64 years with health insurance / Total population 18-64 years, 2010 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey 
Rationale: Individuals with health insurance are more likely to be able to afford prescription medications, 
increasing the interest of pharmaceutical companies to associate with physicians in these states. 
 
Number of Retail Prescriptions Filled at Pharmacies (Person/Year) 
Definition: Total number of prescription drugs filled at retail pharmacies in 2011 / Population in 2011. 
Source: The Kaiser Family Foundation, statehealthfacts.org. Retail Prescription Drugs Filled at 
Pharmacies (Annual per Capita), 2011. Data Source: SDI Health, L.L.C.: Special Data Request, 2012 and 
Calculations based on U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 Population Estimates, 
http://www.census.gov/popest/data/index.html. 
Rationale: Pharmaceutical companies may be more interested in associating with physicians in states with 
a bigger prescription drug market size. 
Additional comments: Kaiser Family Foundation notes that prescription data are based on IMS's Vector 
One® database which collects data from a panel of retail pharmacies, third party payers, and data 
providers. “Retail pharmacies” include independent pharmacies, chain pharmacies, food stores, and mass 
merchandisers, and exclude prescriptions filled by mail order; includes both brand name and generic 
drugs; and may include a small portion of over-the-counter medications and drugs transferred to different 
containers solely for distribution purposes. 
 
Population Density (Thousands/Square Mile) 
Definition: Total population (thousands), 2010 / Land area of state (square miles) 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey and Statistical Abstract of the United States 
Rationale: In densely populated areas, it may be easier for one physician to influence other physicians (for 
example, through more interaction with other physicians on a regular basis, whether casual or through 
well-attended speaking engagements). This may increase the interest of pharmaceutical companies in 
associating with physicians in more densely populated states. 
 
Number of Physicians with Active Licenses 
Definition: Number of physicians with active licenses, 2009-2010 
Source: American Medical Association 
Rationale: The amount that pharmaceutical companies are willing to pay physicians may be inversely 
associated with companies’ ability to find another physician with similar qualifications. For example, if a 
pharmaceutical company can only locate one physician in a state with particular qualifications, then it 
may be willing to pay that physician $250. But if a pharmaceutical company can locate five similar 
physicians, then it may only be willing to pay that physician $100. 
Additional comments: May include physicians who do not regularly practice medicine, such as those with 
primarily research or administrative responsibilities. 
 
Number of Nurses with Active Licenses 
Definition: Number of nurses with active licenses, 2010 
Source: American Hospital Association 
Rationale: Disclosure data may occasionally contain payments made to nurses. Otherwise similar 
rationale to the number of physicians with active licenses. 
 
Table 2 also presents summary statistics for these independent variables. States with strong disclosure 
laws, weak disclosure laws, and no disclosure laws are not observably different on most demographic 
characteristics. The exceptions are population density, number of active physicians, and number of active 
nurses. States with strong disclosure laws have greater population density than states with no disclosure 
laws but less than states with weak disclosure laws. States with strong disclosure laws and no disclosure 
laws have similar numbers of active physicians and active nurses, while states with weak disclosure laws 
have more active physicians and nurses. 
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n in Table 3. 
* P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001. 
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* P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001 
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(0.113 - 0.186) 
(0.128 - 0.157) 
(0.173 - 0.180) 
(-0.0941 - -0.0857) 
(0.0355 - 0.0402) 
(-0.205 - -0.186) 
(-0.0282 - -0.0271) 









































(-0.465 - -0.247) 
(0.0436 - 0.129) 
(6.63e-05 - 0.0209) 
(-0.0548 - -0.0296) 
(-0.0268 - -
0.0126) 
(-0.0985 - -0.0419) 
(-0.00306 - 
0.000396) 






















y indicators for each state and year. 
 





Model  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
          
      { Difference in Payments Between MA and All Other 
States, Before and After Public Release of MA 
Payments } 
         






State-Year Physician-Year Physician-Year 
         





































         
Independent Variable          
Disclosure Laws With 
Public Reporting (“Strong”) 
-0.488*** 0.101 1.785* -0.255***    
P   <0.001 0.188 0.0236 <0.001    








   
          
Disclosure Laws Without 
Public Reporting (“Weak”) 
-0.176 -0.0880 0.506 -0.0614    
P   0.104 0.0551 0.386 0.321    








   
          
Massachusetts x After 
Public Release in MA 
    -0.356*** 8.503*** -0.0685*** 
P       <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(95% CI)      (-0.465, -0.247) (5.611, 11.39) (-0.0841, 
-0.0530) 
          
N   153 425,797 139,019 2,257,059 153 141,736 2,257,059 
R2   0.99 0.215   0.972   
*Adjusted for company providing payment, category of payment, year, and statewide demographics. Demographics are 
household income, average physician wage, cost of living, % population < 18, % population ≥ 65, % unemployment, % ≥ high 
school education, % health insurance, annual prescription drugs filled at pharmacies/person, population density, number of 
active physicians, and number of active nurses.  Full results displayed in Appendix 3.  Additional LASSO controls in Appendix 8.  
Standard errors clustered at the state level.  Columns 3, 4, 6, and 7 implement truncated regressions. 
**Included a zero for physicians who accepted no payments. 
 
  
Appendix 8 LASSO variables 
Annual Physician Mean Wage Number of Paid Physicians 
% Unemployment Number of Physicians 
Physicians Per Capita Number of Nurses 
Population Land Area 
Population Density Percent Under 18 
Percent Over 65 Cost of Living Index 
Prescribed Drugs Per Capita Adoption Rate 
Percent of Women Aged 25-29 Percent of Women Aged 30-34 
Percent Hispanic Percent Non-Hispanic 
Percent Insured Percent of Women Working 
High School Completion Income Per Capita 
Percent in Large Firms Raw Consumer Price Index 
Consumer Price Index Real Income Per Capita 
% Payments from each Company by Value and by Count % Payments in each Payment Category by Value and by Count 
Year Fixed Effects All two-way interactions between any of these variables 
 
Variables selected by LASSO for state-level regressions 
Number of Paid Physicians * % Payments by Count for 
Cephalon 
Unemployment Rate * % Payments by Count from Pfizer 
Number of Paid Physicians * % Payments by Value for Items % Payments by Count from Cephalon * % Payments by Count 
from Pfizer 
Percent Under 18 * % Payments by Count for Meals % Payments by Count from Eli Lilly * % Payments by Value for 
Speaking 
Cost of Living Index * % Payments by Count for Consulting % Payments by Count from Pfizer * % Payments by Count for 
Meals 
Prescribed Drugs Per Capita * Percent of Women Aged 25-
29 
% Payments by Count for Meals * % Payments by Value for 
Speaking 
Prescribed Drugs Per Capita * % Payments by Value from 
AstraZeneca 
% Payments by Count for Meals * Year 2010 Fixed Effect 
Prescribed Drugs Per Capita * % Payments by Value from 
Johnson & Johnson 
% Payments by Value for Research * Year 2010 Fixed Effect 
Prescribed Drugs Per Capita * % Payments by Count for 
Meals 
Employment Rate * % Payments by Value for Consulting 
Annual Physician Mean Wage * % Payments by Count for 
Speaking 
Physicians Per Capita * % Payments by Count for Research 
Percent in Large Firms * % Payments by Count from Pfizer Population Density * Population Density 
 
Variables selected by LASSO for paid physician-level regressions 
% Payments by Count for Speaking Cost of Living Index * % Payments by Count for Speaking 
Physicians Per Capita * % Payments by Count for Other Drugs Per Capita * % Payments by Count for Meals 
Percent Over 65 * % Payments by Count for Meals Drugs Per Capita * % Payments by Count for Other 
Cost of Living Index * % Payments by Count for Consulting Drugs Per Capita * Year 2011 Fixed Effect 
Adoption Rate * % Payments by Count for Consulting Percent Insured * % Payments by Count for Meals 
Percent in Large Firms * % Payments by Count for Meals % Unemployment * % Payments by Count from Merck 
% Unemployment * % Payments by Count for Consulting % Unemployment * % Payments by Count for Speaking 
% Payments by Count from Cephalon * % Payments by 
Count for Meals 
% Payments by Value from Eli Lilly * % Payments by Count for 
Meals 
Physicians Per Capita * % Payments by Value for Consulting Drugs Per Capita * % Payments by Value for Consulting 




Variables selected by LASSO for physician-level regressions 
Real Income Per Capita * Year 2009 Fixed Effect % Unemployment * Number of Nurses 
Drugs Per Capita * Percent Under 18 Drugs Per Capita * Year 2009 Fixed Effect 
% Unemployment * Year 2009 Fixed Effect Drugs Per Capita * Year 2010 Fixed Effect 
% Unemployment * Year 2010 Fixed Effect  
